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INTRODUCTION
Since the 1990’s, more and more litigants have turned to third
parties for financial support in meeting their litigation costs. In “alter-
native litigation financing” (“ALF”), an investor provides a cash
payment to a litigant in return for a share of any recovery in the case.1
As ALF has become more widespread, it has become the subject of sig-
nificant debate.
Advocates for new forms of litigation funding argue that ALF
increases access to justice for parties who have legitimate claims but
lack the resources to pursue them.2 In this respect, making ALF more
widely available can help level the playing field in litigation, correcting
structural dynamics that have traditionally favored wealthy litigants.
* I am so blessed & greatly appreciate the love of my life, M.G.S, for her enduring
support and continuously making me a better person every day! Roni lead the Litigation
Finance team at TownCenter Partners LLC, Our Mission Is Justice. Roni can be reached at
roni@yourtcp.com. To the FAMU Law Review, a heartfelt thank you and gratitude for your
efforts, and laser sharp attention to detail. Roni is the Asset Manager at TownCenter Part-
ners LLC, litigation Finance; Our Mission Is Justice who assist Plaintiff’s NationWide &
International for all case types.
1. Joshua Hunt, What Litigation Finance Is Really About, NEW YORKER (Sept. 1,
2016), http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/what-litigation-finance-is-really-about
(last visited Oct. 31, 2018).
2. Id.
111
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In addition, advocates for ALF point out that permitting third-party
investment in legal claims can bring market forces into the judicial
system, directing financial resources to the claims with the greatest
chance of success.3
Critics of ALF contend that such financing methods create vari-
ous problems:  they violate well-established principles of common law
about the relationship between litigants and third-parties; they are
tantamount to usurious loans; and they threaten the integrity of the
judicial system by making it easier for litigants with few resources to
bring frivolous lawsuits.4
This article discusses both sides of this debate and concludes
that the most prevalent criticisms of ALF are based upon misconcep-
tions and myths about the nature of ALF transactions and of the
interests of the parties involved in those transactions. When ALF is
carefully considered, it is not fundamentally different from a variety of
financial arrangements that are widely accepted in different economic
contexts. At the most basic level, the investment in a legal claim is
much like the purchase of an interest in any other asset.5 Bringing this
kind of financial arrangement into the legal sector may threaten some
well-established but outmoded assumptions, but it does not threaten
the fundamental objectives of the legal system. To the contrary, ALF
allows cases to be decided on their merits instead of being decided by
the relative financial power of the parties.
I. THE BASICS OF ALF
In the broadest sense, ALF refers to a variety of mechanisms by
which a litigant receives funds from a third party in return for a share
of the proceeds of the case. The litigant may use the funds to cover
litigation expenses, including attorneys’ fees or discovery costs, expert
witness fees, and the like.6 The litigant may also use the funds to cover
its own living or medical expenses during the pendency of the case.7
This latter approach occurs most often in personal injury cases when
the plaintiff’s injury causes financial losses that the plaintiff cannot
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61, 62 (2011)
(discussing common law prohibitions against the assignment of lawsuits and maintenance);
Anthony J. Sebok, Betting on Tort Suits After the Event: From Champerty to Insurance, 60
DEPAUL L. REV. 453, 453-56 (2011); Julia H. McLaughlin, Litigation Funding: Charting a
Legal and Ethical Course, 31 VT. L. REV. 615, 643-46 (2007).
5. Hunt, supra note 1.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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pay out of his or her own pocket. In most ALF transactions, the third
party’s investment is “non-recourse,” meaning that the third party only
receives payment if the litigant has a recovery. If the litigant loses, the
third party also loses its investment.8 In addition, some ALF compa-
nies provide funding directly to plaintiffs’ law firms; these advances,
however, are typically made on a recourse basis.9
A wide variety of litigants rely on ALF, including both plaintiffs
and defendants. In some cases, the litigants are large, well-heeled bus-
iness enterprises with valuable claims that wish to manage their
litigation risk, and the funders are sophisticated investors whose par-
ticipation is akin to that of venture capitalists. In other cases, the
party receiving funding is an individual with a personal injury claim
who needs funds immediately.10 The one thing that recipients of ALF
have in common is the desire to spread the risk of litigation by sharing
some of the benefits.11
Even as the business of offering ALF has grown dramatically in
the last two decades, there is little information on the number of in-
vestments made by ALF companies or on the typical amount of
investment.12 Information from a couple of the leading litigation fi-
nance companies shows that their average investment is less than
$5000.13 Other sources indicate that the average investment reflects
less than ten percent of the estimated value of the ALF recipient’s un-
derlying legal claim.14 Other ALF companies focus on making much
larger investments in much more valuable claims.15
8. Id.
9. See STEVEN GARBER, ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES:
ISSUES, KNOWNS, AND UNKNOWNS, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE LAW, FIN., AND CAPITAL
MKTS. PROGRAM 13 (2010); Jonathan T. Molot, Litigation Finance: A Market Solution to a
Procedural Problem, 99 GEO. L.J. 65, 98-101 (2010); see generally Am. Bar Ass’n Comm’n on
Ethics 20/20, Informational Report to the House of Delegates, AM. BAR ASS’N 8,6, http://www
.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20111212_ethics_20_20_alf_
white_paper_final_hod_informational_report.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2017)
[hereinafter ABA WHITE PAPER] (distinguishing specialized ALF suppliers that provides
loans from ALF companies that purchase claims from clients).
10. McLaughlin, supra note 4, at 615-16.
11. ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 5.
12. Sheri P. Adler, Note, Alternative Litigation Finance and the Usury Challenge: A
Multi-Factor Approach, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 329, 331 (2012).
13. GARBER, supra note 9, at 12.
14. Adler, supra note 12, at 331, n.9.
15. Adam Gerchen et al., Litigation: The Newest Corporate Finance Tool, FINANCIER
WORLDWIDE (Sept. 2014), https://www.financierworldwide.com/litigation-the-newest-corpo
rate-finance-tool/#.WGQVErGZP_Q.
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II. ALF INCREASES ACCESS TO JUSTICE
The most important benefit of ALF is that it can increase access
to justice.16 There is no doubt that many less affluent parties face sig-
nificant barriers to entry to the legal system, regardless of whether
they have meritorious claims. According to one estimate, there are only
five to six thousand lawyers available to serve the legal needs of more
than forty-five million low-income individuals, who might be eligible
for some form of legal aid from a public interest organization.17 Even
though lawyers’ professional groups call upon all lawyers for a greater
commitment to pro bono work, an enormous void remains.18
This is where ALF comes in. In cases where there are signifi-
cant financial remedies available to compensate for wrongdoing, the
invisible hand of private markets can direct litigation funding to par-
ties who need and deserve it. In this way, litigation funding is not just
an instrument for making people wealthy – it is also an important in-
strument for doing good.
There is nothing novel about the idea that a third party can
provide a litigant with something of value so that the litigant can pur-
sue a meritorious legal claim. Advocacy and public interest groups of
all kinds have long provided free legal representation to litigants and,
in that connection, have also covered the litigant’s litigation costs.
Long ago, the Supreme Court ruled that there was nothing wrong with
this kind of assistance.19
For example, in the early 1960’s, Virginia enacted a statute that
prohibited the “improper” solicitation of legal or professional busi-
ness.20 The statute was written broadly enough so that it was unlawful
for civil rights groups, such as the National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People (“NAACP”), to help plaintiffs who sought
to bring lawsuits in order to fight various forms of racial segregation.21
The NAACP sued, arguing that this statute was unconstitutional.22
Virginia responded by arguing that the common law had long sup-
ported prohibitions on any attempt to stir up or encourage parties to
16. Hunt, supra note 1.
17. David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public-Interest
Lawyers, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 209, 211 (2003).
18. See, e.g., Jason M. Wilson, Comment, Litigation Finance in the Public Interest, 64
AM. U. L. REV. 385, 387 (2014).
19. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
20. Id. at 419 (discussing Chapters 31, 32, 33, 35 and 36 of the Virginia Acts of Assem-
bly, 1956 Extra Session).
21. See id. at 433-35.
22. Id. at 417-18.
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file or continue litigation. The Supreme Court agreed with the
NAACP.23 In his majority opinion, Justice William Brennan pointed
out that “association for litigation may be the most effective form of
political association” for minority groups and others who face various
forms of government or social oppression.24 He ruled that “a State may
not, under the guise of prohibiting professional misconduct, ignore con-
stitutional rights.”25 Thus, he concluded that “[w]e hold that the
activities of the NAACP, its affiliates and legal staff shown on this re-
cord are modes of expression and association protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments which Virginia may not prohibit, under its
power to regulate the legal profession . . . .”26
Of course, there is a difference between advocacy and public in-
terest groups like the NAACP and ALF companies. The NAACP’s
participation was motivated by a desire to accomplish political and so-
cial change, while ALF companies are motivated by the pursuit of a
financial return on their investment. But there is no reason to think
that this difference will make ALF companies less effective in promot-
ing access to justice. It is axiomatic that an investor cannot make a
profit on a frivolous claim that loses. Like advocacy groups, ALF com-
panies need and want to support winning cases. In this respect, they
share an objective but have different reasons for pursuing that objec-
tive. If this objective permits advocacy groups to promote access to
justice, then the same is true for ALF companies.
III. ALF PROMOTES THE MORE EFFICIENT MANAGEMENT
OF LITIGATION COSTS
ALF can also promote greater economic efficiencies for litigants.
By giving litigants greater financial resources, ALF permits litigants
to direct their own limited resources to the most profitable outlets.
Moreover, because they have extensive expertise about the financial
side of litigation, ALF companies can provide valuable advice to the
litigants they work with regarding how to make the best use of their
funding.
These efficiency gains are available to litigants regardless of
how many or how few resources they can devote to litigation. A com-
pany’s decision to start a lawsuit means that it will have to divert
resources that would otherwise go to its own business operations. Addi-
23. Id. at 438-39.
24. Id. at 431.
25. Button, 371 U.S. at 439.
26. Id. at 428-29.
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tionally, the costs of litigation are substantial and hard to predict. Of
course, there are the direct costs, such as attorneys’ fees and discovery
costs. But the indirect costs can be just as burdensome, including infor-
mation, monitoring, transaction, and decision costs.27
Litigation financiers can solve or reduce most of these problems.
The most common example is when the litigation funder supplies the
initial and ongoing investment to cover litigation expenses, eliminating
the need for the company to divert its own capital (or credit capacity)
from business functions.28 Moreover, litigation financiers will inform a
business plaintiff about the relative strength of the company’s case and
about realistic settlement options.29
Litigation financiers also have the capacity to reduce some of
the potential conflict between the interests of the business and those of
the law firm. Litigation financiers often have leverage to encourage the
law firm to accept a contingent fee, meaning that the firm has the
same incentive as the client, to achieve a successful result and cannot
count on profiting from a loss with a large hourly fee.30
Litigation financing can also allow companies to convert their
legal positions into immediately available funds. For example, if a com-
pany has won a judgment, but is waiting for appeals to conclude before
cashing in, an advance from a litigation funder makes it possible for it
to “convert a contingent, intangible asset into cash that can be
redeployed into more productive uses.”31 Furthermore, the risk of loss
in the appeals process can be minimized or eliminated.32
In the end, third-party investment in business litigation
presents an enticing trade to business plaintiffs:  in return for surren-
dering the right to a portion of the potential gains from litigation,
business plaintiffs can free themselves of all of the underlying risks
and costs. Additionally, there is little risk that business plaintiffs will
be exploited in making this trade. Because business plaintiffs are so-
phisticated parties with numerous options, it is unlikely that they will
be taken advantage of in making an agreement with the investor. As a
result, both the litigation financier and the business can craft an in-
vestment relationship that can be mutually advantageous.
27. See Joanna M. Shepherd & Judd E. Stone II, Economic Conundrums in Search of a
Solution: The Functions of Third-Party Litigation Finance, 47 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 919, 945-46
(2015); Gerchen, supra note 15.
28. Gerchen, et al, supra note 15.
29. Shepherd & Stone II, supra note 27, at 921.
30. Gerchen et al., supra note 15.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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IV. BUSTING MYTHS ABOUT ALF
The critics of ALF cannot really dispute that these benefits are
real, but they insist that the detriments of ALF far outweigh these ben-
efits. Although critics differ in their focus on alleged problems, the
most common criticisms are: (1) ALF is a form of lending that imposes
usurious interest rates; (2) the availability of ALF will promote frivo-
lous litigation; and (3) the contract between an ALF company and a
litigant has the capacity to interrupt the attorney-client relationship or
create unnecessary ethical problems for the attorney. When examined
closely in light of the increasing experience with ALF, this “parade of
horrors” turns out to be more speculative than factual.
A. Litigation Finance Is Not Usury
To some critics, ALF is nothing more than the litigation
equivalent of payday lending. These critics insist that, at its core, the
provision of ALF is a predatory lending practice that exploits personal
injury claimants.33 According to this argument, the fees charged by
ALF companies constitute an interest payment, and, as such, they
often violate state usury laws.34 “The financing fees charged by ALF
companies are largely unregulated, giving rise to a vociferous outcry
among critics who view ALF as a predatory practice aimed at taking
advantage of personal injury victims.”35 This argument is misplaced,
however, because it ignores the factual foundation of ALF
transactions.
The principal reason for concluding that ALF is not lending is
that ALF almost always involves a non-recourse payment to the liti-
gant. That is, the litigant’s duty to repay the advance is contingent, not
absolute. This distinction has been widely recognized by courts in dif-
ferent states.36 For example, in Kraft v. Mason,37 a Florida case, the
plaintiff contracted with her brother to fund his legal costs in pursuing
an antitrust lawsuit.38 According to the contract, she would be entitled
to the return of the funds she advanced along with interest if her
33. John P. Barylick & Jenna Wims Hashway, Litigation Financing: Preying on Plain-
tiffs, 59 R.I.B.J. 5 (Mar./Apr. 2011).
34. Id.
35. Adler, supra note 12, at 331.
36. See, e.g., WRI Opportunity Loans II, LLC. v. Cooper, 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 205, 212 (Ct.
App. 2007); Fikes v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 533 P.2d 251, 263 (Alaska 1975); Searge-
ant v. Smith, 163 P.2d 680, 680-81 (Ariz. 1945).
37. Kraft v. Mason, 668 So. 2d 679 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
38. Id. at 681-82.
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brother won the suit.39 The brother argued that the funding contract
was unenforceable because it violated Florida’s usury laws.40 The court
rejected the brother’s usury defense because, among other reasons, it
concluded that usury law did not apply to a transaction in which the
duty of repayment was contingent.41
Courts have also held that usury laws do not apply when there
is the slightest chance that the obligation to repay will not arise. In
Anglo-Dutch Petroleum International, Inc. v. Haskell,42 the ALF recipi-
ent argued its duty to repay did not depend upon a true contingency
because, at the time when it entered into the ALF agreement, there
was no real risk that it would lose the underlying lawsuit. In this con-
nection, the recipient/plaintiff pointed out that the funding occurred
after discovery had revealed documents that conclusively established
the defendant’s liability. In the plaintiff’s view, the state of the evi-
dence at the time of the funding made it virtually certain that it would
prevail and that it would have a duty to repay.43 The court rejected this
argument by distinguishing between the concepts of “risk” and “contin-
gency.”44 According to the court, an event is contingent if there is any
chance that it can occur. The concept of “risk” relates to the likelihood
of the contingent event, but a contingency is still present even in a case
where the risk of loss is very, very low.45 Thus, the court declined to
apply Texas’ usury laws to the ALF transaction.46
Some courts have disagreed with these conclusions, however.
Recently in Oasis Legal Financial Group, LLC v. Coffman, the Colo-
rado Supreme Court held that ALF transactions are subject to
Colorado’s usury laws, notwithstanding the contingency of the right to
repayment.47 In that case, an ALF company and a litigant entered into
an ALF agreement, which provided for a non-recourse advance and
was careful to characterize the transaction as a sale of a right to par-
ticipate in the litigation, not a loan. Nevertheless, the Colorado
Supreme Court held that the transaction met the crucial requirements
39. Id. at 681.
40. Id. at 682.
41. Id. at 684.
42. Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, Inc. v. Haskell, 193 S.W.3d 87 (Tex. App. 2006) (adju-
dicating an ALF claim related to litigation for misappropriation of trade secrets and breach
of confidentiality agreements).
43. Id. at 94.
44. Id. at 97.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Oasis Legal Fin. Grp., LLC v. Coffman, 361 P.3d 400, 401(Colo. 2015).
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of the definition of “loan” for the purposes of the state’s usury laws.48 In
this connection, the court specifically rejected the contention that the
transactions did not involve loans because they created only a contin-
gent right to repayment, not an absolute one.49 The Supreme Court
explained:
Litigation finance transactions create repayment obligations—
debt—at the outset. That fact is unaffected by the finance compa-
nies’ subsequent reduction or cancellation of certain plaintiffs’
obligations. And in eighty-five percent of cases, the companies fully
recover. Therefore, in evaluating these transactions, we focus on
how they are designed to work and how they actually work most of
the time.50
Similarly, a New York court has held that an advance to a liti-
gant would be characterized as a loan when there is little or no risk
that the litigant will lose. In Echeverria v. Estate of Lindner,51 the
plaintiff was a day laborer who asserted a personal injury claim
against his employer - after he fell from a scaffold and suffered severe
injuries, which necessitated a spinal fusion surgery.52 The plaintiff ob-
tained an advance from an ALF company to cover the cost of his
surgery and other expenses. The fee for the advance was calculated as
3.85 percent of the amount of the advance per month, and the fee was
compounded.53 Given that the defendant was subject to statutory strict
liability for the plaintiff’s injuries, the court concluded that the ad-
vance had to be characterized as either a usurious loan or an
unenforceable gambling contract.
[I]t is ludicrous to consider this transaction anything else but a loan
unless the court was to consider it legalized gambling. Is it a gam-
ble to loan/invest money to a plaintiff in a Labor Law action where
there is strict liability? I think not. In fact, it might be considered a
“sure thing.” In any event, the only gambling allowed in this state is
run by the state or on Native American facilities. Thus, it is not a
gamble, but a “sure thing,” therefore, it is a loan, not an investment
with great risk. If it is a loan, then the interest rate charged is usu-
rious and the court could vitiate the agreement.54
48. Id. at 408.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Echeverria v. Estate of Lindner, No.018666/2002, 2005 WL 1083704, at *1-2 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Mar. 2, 2005).
52. Id. at *1-2.
53. Id. at *2.
54. Id. at *9.
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This division of opinion among state courts suggests that accu-
rately characterizing the nature of an ALF transaction may depend
upon a factor other than the contingency of the duty to repay. As an
alternative to this traditional usury test, tax law offers an analytical
method in which courts examine a number of factors to determine
whether a particular transaction involves the creation of a debt or an
equity interest.55 The structure of the analysis varies from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction, but the fundamental elements are generally consis-
tent.56 Some courts consider thirteen factors:
(1) the names given to the certificates evidencing the indebtedness;
(2) the presence or absence of a fixed maturity date; (3) the source of
payments; (4) the right to enforce payment of principal and inter-
est; (5) participation in management flowing as a result; (6) the
status of the contribution in relation to regular corporate creditors;
(7) the intent of the parties; (8) “thin” or adequate capitalization; (9)
identity of interest between creditor and stockholder; (10) source of
interest payments; (11) the ability of the corporation to obtain loans
from outside lending institutions; (12) the extent to which the ad-
vance was used to acquire capital assets; and (13) the failure of the
debtor to repay on the due date or to seek a postponement.57
The ultimate objective of the test is to determine whether the
funds involved in the transaction were placed “at the risk of the busi-
ness.”58 As the Second Circuit put it, the distinction between debt and
equity depends upon “whether the funds were advanced with reasona-
ble expectations of repayment regardless of the success of the venture
or [whether they] were placed at the risk of the business.”59
When this multi-factor analysis is applied to the typical ALF
transaction, the weight of the factors indicates that ALF is better char-
acterized as an investment rather than a loan.60 ALF contracts lack
the essential indicia of loans such as promissory notes, fixed maturity
dates, fixed interest payments, or rights to enforce repayment.61 Even
55. Adler, supra note 12, at 340; see also William T. Plumb, Jr., Comment, The Federal
Tax Income Significance of Corporate Debt: A Critical Analysis and a Proposal, 26 TAX L.
REV. 369 (1971).
56. Adler, supra note 12, at 340 (citing cases).
57. Adler, supra note 12, at 341; see also Stinnett’s Pontiac Serv., Inc. v. Comm’r, 730
F.2d 634, 638 (11th Cir. 1984); In re Indian Lake Estates, Inc., 448 F.2d 574, 578-79 (5th
Cir.1971); Tyler v. Tomlinson, 414 F.2d 844, 848 (5th Cir.1969).
58. See Gilbert v. Comm’r, 248 F.2d 399, 406 (2d Cir. 1957).
59. Id.
60. See Adler, supra note 12, at 352-53.
61. Id. at 353.
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more significantly, the litigant’s duty to repay the advance depends
upon the success of its “business venture” – that is, the lawsuit.62
To be sure, there are some factors that are not consistent with
the idea that an ALF contract creates an equity interest. In particular,
the ALF company does not acquire any control over the venture.63 In-
deed, rules of legal ethics demand that an attorney receive direction
only from the litigant and not from any person or entity providing
funds to the litigant. In addition, the advanced funds are not required
to be used for the lawsuit itself; in many ALF transactions, the liti-
gants are free to use the advance for any purpose.64 But when all of the
factors are considered, and when one focuses on the question whether
the advanced funds are put “at the risk of the business,” the best analy-
sis is to treat the ALF transaction as the purchase of an equity interest
and not as a loan. Consequently, usury laws would not apply to ALF
transactions.
B. Litigation Finance Will Not Increase Frivolous Litigation
Critics of ALF also predict that frivolous lawsuits will increase
if litigants can find investors to cover their litigation costs.65 In addi-
tion, these critics also worry that litigation matters will continue too
long if parties do not face economic pressure to resolve the case before
trial.66 While these concerns may seem plausible at first glance, they
fall apart under close scrutiny.
The principal problem with this criticism is that it is premised
on the assumption that ALF will be available to any litigant, regard-
less of any prospects of success. If ALF companies handed out advances
to anyone and everyone, the prediction of increased frivolous litigation
might prove prescient but ALF companies are in the business of invest-
ing in cases with a real chance of success. If ALF is permitted freely,
investment capital will flow to the most meritorious claims, not the
most frivolous ones.67
There is very little empirical evidence about whether this theo-




65. Lisa A. Rickard, The Real and Ugly Facts of Litigation Funding, U.S. CHAMBER
INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/resource/
the-real-and-ugly-facts-of-litigation-funding.
66. See id.
67. See Michael I. Krauss, Alternate Dispute Financing and Legal Ethics: Free the Law-
yers!, 32 MISS. C.L. REV. 247, 260-66 (2013).
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however, a limited amount of empirical evidence from other countries
supporting the effectiveness of ALF. That evidence suggests that mak-
ing funding available to litigants will not promote frivolous or long
cases.
A recent study from Australia is instructive. Australia has had
a robust market for investment in legal claims for over a decade, and
data about its judicial system can provide some meaningful informa-
tion about how litigation finance actually affects the legal system.68
Two law professors have recently analyzed that data and reached the
conclusion that more litigation financing can lead to a somewhat big-
ger burden for courts, but also to fairer outcomes and better judicial
decisions.69 The study concluded that ALF appears to have had a mod-
est impact on the functioning of courts. In Australian jurisdictions with
a larger number of active litigation funders, there is a greater backlog
in courts, fewer finalizations, and lower clearance rates.70 Unsurpris-
ingly, then, court expenditures also increase.71
There are good reasons to think that the net effect of ALF is
positive, notwithstanding something of an increase in court congestion.
Even when the cost of litigation to parties and the courts increases,
there can still be an overall social benefit if these longer and more nu-
merous cases produce more economically efficient results. Another
benefit of ALF is that it seems to produce more cases that generate
published opinions.72 The Australian data showed that funded cases
both cite and receive over twice as many references as unfunded cases.
This data suggests that ALF is not just generating more value for
plaintiffs and investors, it is making better law.73
More encouraging data comes from the Netherlands. Although
the Netherlands do not have the same kind of ALF business that is
found in the United States or Australia, it recently experienced an in-
creased use of legal expenses insurance.74 Such insurance, also known
as pre-paid legal insurance, covers policyholders against the potential
costs of legal action brought by or against the policyholder.75 The poli-
cyholder pays a regular premium and receives a guarantee that certain
68. David S. Abrams & Daniel L. Chen, A Market for Justice: A First Empirical Look at
Third Party Litigation Funding, 15 U. PENN. J. BUS. L. 1075, 1106-07 (2013).
69. See id.
70. Id. at 1106.
71. Id.
72. See id. at 1105.
73. Id.
74. See Michael G. Faure et al., Funding of Personal Injury Litigation and Claims Cul-
ture: Evidence from the Netherlands, 2 UTRECHT L. REV. 1, 19-20 (2006).
75. See id.
\\jciprod01\productn\F\FAM\13-1\FAM102.txt unknown Seq: 13  7-AUG-19 14:38
2017 CRITICS OF LITIGATION FINANCE 123
legal expenses, including attorneys’ fees, will be paid on the policy-
holder’s behalf.76 In this respect, legal expenses insurance can be the
practical equivalent of third-party litigation funding in that it relieves
a party from the financial risk of engaging in litigation.
The expanding reliance on legal expenses insurance in the
Netherlands has not led to a corresponding increase in legal claims,
however. Between 1999 and 2003, the number of policies for legal ex-
penses insurance increased by over 30 percent, but the number of
personal injury claims remained stable.77 Thus, even though more
Netherlanders had an opportunity to sue without bearing the costs of
the suit, they did not exploit it.78
C. Litigation Finance Will Not Disrupt the
Attorney-Client Relationship
The third primary critique of ALF is that the presence of an
ALF company may disrupt the attorney-client relationship.79 Specifi-
cally, critics maintain that the ALF company may take improper
control over the litigant’s choices or that the ALF company may under-
mine the attorney-client privilege by seeking confidential information
about the case as a condition of funding.80 Although such problems are
possible in theory, it is fairly easy for both lawyers and ALF companies
to make sure that there is no disruption in the attorney-client
relationship.
With respect to the question of control over litigation, legal eth-
ics rules make it abundantly clear that the attorney’s primary duty is
to his client and to no other party.81 This rule provides the primary
bulwark against improper control by any third-party who has a finan-
cial interest in the outcome of litigation. This rule has worked well for
decades in preventing insurance companies from asserting their own
interests over and against the interests of their insured who are de-
fendants in lawsuits. There is no reason to think that it will not work
equally when applied to ALF companies.
As for the attorney-client privilege, it is true that ALF compa-
nies often need to communicate about a case with the attorney for a
litigant who seeks funding. The financing company needs an insider’s
76. Id.
77. Id. at 13-14.
78. Id. at 14.
79. See Rickard, supra note 65.
80. Id.
81. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
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viewpoint to be able to assess the prospects for success; so, they obtain
information about the case from the attorney who is preparing it. In
theory, this communication could waive the privilege that protects the
attorney’s mental impressions and legal theories about the case.
A federal district court in Delaware, however, has rejected that
theory in an intellectual property dispute. In Ioengine, LLC v. Interac-
tive Media Corp.,82 Ioengine sought ALF, and its opponent in the case
submitted a discovery request for seventy documents prepared by
Ioengine’s attorney in connection with the due diligence process for
ALF.83 Ioengine resisted the request, and the district court ruled that
the documents were privileged, relying on opinions from federal dis-
trict courts in Texas and Pennsylvania, which addressed similar
discovery issues.84 These rulings suggest that there should be no sig-
nificant risk of privilege waivers from working with an ALF company,
as long as the company, the litigant, and the attorney take reasonable
care in deciding what kinds of documents to disclose in the due dili-
gence process.
CONCLUSION
Although its critics like to portray ALF as a dangerous novelty,
it is neither very new nor very threatening to the integrity of the judi-
cial process. The American judicial system has long been characterized
by disparities of power and access to resources. ALF helps to reduce
those disparities and give less affluent parties a chance to assure that
their lawsuits will be determined on their merits alone. Although there
is a theoretical risk of abuse or impropriety in ALF transactions, that
risk is present in every aspect of the legal system, including areas that
are taken for granted, such as the payment of litigation costs by third-
party insurers. In the end, this slight risk is more than outweighed by
the benefits that ALF can bring to litigants and the judicial system as
a whole.
82. Order at 2, n.1, Ioengine, LLC v. Interactive Media Corp., No. 14-1571-GMS (D.
Del. Aug. 3, 2016) http://www.delawareiplaw.com/files/2016/08/IOENGINE-14-1571.pdf.
83. Id.
84. Id.
